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The end of the 1990’s saw a number of foreign automobile manufacturers become the
largest shareholders in several Japanese automobile manufacturers. It seems logical to
conclude that a firm only enters into a partial ownership arrangement (POA) if it is profit
maximizing. However, research to date has treated POAs as if exogenous to the model.
This paper develops a model that assumes POAs are determined endogenously. Data for
the Japanese automobile industry are then used to investigate the factors that determine
whether a firm enters into a POA, and the effects a POA has on the price-cost margin. The
findings of this paper suggest that while both foreign and domestic firms take an interest in
product mix when exploring POAs in the Japanese market, they have differing profit
incentives. Furthermore, the level of ownership has a positive effect on POAs.
JEL classification codes: L0; L6
Key words: partial ownership arrangements, price-cost margin, technology
transfers
I. Introduction
During the 1990’s, partial ownership arrangements (POAs) were very
common in the Japanese automobile industry. One of the outstanding features
associated with this POA  activity is that, while Japanese automakers did not
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invest in foreign automakers, several foreign automakers did invest in Japanese
firms. Ford first invested in Mazda in 1979 purchasing 25% of its shares. In
1996 it increased its ownership in Mazda to 33.4% and sent a new president
from the U.S. Similarly, Renault bought 36% of Nissan and 22.3% of Nissan
Diesel in 1999. The same year, GM entered into a POA with Subaru purchasing
20% of Subaru’s stock.1
In past literature, the decision of a firm to enter into a POA was determined
exogenously. Alley (1997) extended the model by Clarke, Davies and Waterson
(1984), in order to include POAs. However, in his model, automakers only
consider output quantities when maximizing profit. We believe that POAs
between automakers facilitate the transfer of technology and managerial skills,
either unilaterally or bilaterally, thereby creating cost-saving synergies which
influence current profits. To capture the effects of such knowledge transfers,
we present a simple model where POA activity is endogenously determined
and empirically testable. Because investment in Japanese automakers, by
foreign automakers, has been unilateral and exports to Japan from foreign
automakers are small, we concentrated on estimating the model with data
from the Japanese automobile industry.
In this paper, we investigated two cases. First, we examined whether there
are any differences in the determinants of POAs when the parent firm is
domestic or foreign.2 Second, we examined the differences in the determinants
of POAs when a parent firm owns more or less than one-third of stock. In the
first case, we are interested in investigating whether the identity of firm owners
is an important factor. In the second case we are interested in examining
whether ownership of one-third, or more, of stock by the investing firm is
critical. We found that there are significant behavioral differences, depending
on who the owners are and the level of ownership.
This paper is organized as follows: In section II, we present our basic
model, where POAs are endogenously determined. In section III, we describe
1 There has also been activity with respect to domestic POAs in the Japanese automobile
industry. For example, Toyota increased its influence in Daihatsu and Hino by raising its
stock holdings to 54.4% and 33.8%, respectively, in 1999.
2 The terms Japanese firm and domestic firm are used interchangeably throughout the
paper. The term foreign firm refers to a firm based outside of Japan.357 PARTIAL OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
several independent variables that may have an impact on POAs. In section
IV, we derive testable equations for the endogenous determination of POAs.
In section V, we present a traditional analysis of the determinants of price-
cost margins and a description of estimation methods. Section VI provides
brief concluding remarks.
II. Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a model of a general industry where n  firms
participate in a two-stage game for the purpose of producing a final good, q.
In the first stage all firms simultaneously determine how much to invest in
each competitor, with the understanding that investment may lead to
technology transfers to and from these firms. In the second stage, firms
determine their optimal production levels.
We denote the percentage of firm i’s stock owned by firm j as sij, (i ¹ j ).
Furthermore, we denote the investment portfolio of firm i as a vector si and
the inclusion of firm i in the investment portfolios of other firms as a vector
s-i. Let the profits that firm i derives from production of qi be given by
() ,() , ( ) , ii i ii i qT s T s pp -- =                                                                            (1)
where Ti denotes incoming technology transfers to firm i from the firms in its
investment portfolio si and T-i denotes outgoing technology transfers to other
firms via s-i. The total profit function for firm i will then be given by
() 1. ii j i j i j ji ji ss pp
¹¹ P= - + åå                                                               (2)
This two-stage game is solved using backward induction. First, we solve
the second stage profit maximization problem where each firm determines its
optimal production level of q based on a conjectural variations assumption.
Simultaneously solving the first order conditions for profit maximization we
obtain the optimal output level for each firm as qi = qi (si , s-i). Next, we
consider the first stage profit maximization problem. Equation (2) is maximized
subject to the following budget constraint358 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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¹ -³ å                                                                                        (3)
where Fi is the total funds available to firm i for investment and Ij  is the total
amount invested in firm j. Using the envelope theorem, the necessary condition
for profit maximization is obtained as
                                                                                                                        (4)
where k denotes variables associated with firm k, (k ¹ i), and li  is the Lagrange
multiplier, which measures the total imputed profits to firm i derived from
transfers of knowledge and/or technology. Summing across equation (4) with
respect to k and rearranging, we obtain
                                                                                                                     (5)
where,
Term A shows the effect of technology transfers on firm i’s own profits as a
result of ownership in other firms. Since the technologies possessed by firms
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¶¶ å  Term B measures the influence of firm i on the profits of
other firms through technology transfers. Term C  indicates the net profits
that firm i derives from POAs.
Now looking at the right-hand side of equation (5), if we assume that both
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the direct and indirect effects of POAs on firm i’s profits are proportional to
firm i’s market share, then  ,
j kk k i







¶¶ ¶ ¶ where MSi and MSj
are the market shares of firms i and j respectively. This infers that the right-
hand side of equation (5) provides the definition for POAs as
This is similar to the definition given for POAs in Alley (1997). In the
next section we examine the determinants of POAs empirically.
III. Empirical Application
In the previous section, we showed that, under reasonable assumptions,
POA’s are related to the net profits derived from portfolio investment (see
equation (5)). In particular, the shadow price, li, contains the effect of
investment on profits through the transfer of technology and management
skills (see equation (4)). In this section, we estimate the effects of several
independent variables on the right-hand side of equation (5), i.e. POA, using
eleven years of data for eleven Japanese automobile manufacturers.3 The
independent variables used are:
- Price-cost margin = PCM is calculated as operating cost over total sales.
Therefore, a higher PCM affects firm i’s imputed profits positively, PCM
also induces an increase in firm i’s market share and may negatively affect
POAs.
- Equity ratio = ER is the ratio of shareholder’s equity to total capital. ER is
generally believed to describe the health of a firm’s management. We anticipate
a positive relationship between ER and POA because a higher ER tends to
suggest greater financial stability and therefore higher potential profits.
- R&D expenditure = R&D is calculated as the ratio of expenditures on research














3 A detailed explanation of the composition and sources of the data set is given in the Data
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expected to increase profits, we anticipate a positive relationship with POA
as potential partner firms will attempt to access profit-generating technologies
through POAs.
- Brands = BRANDS is calculated as the ratio of advertising expenditures to
total sales. We anticipate a positive relationship with POA as potential partner-
firms are expected to enter into POAs in order to gain access to profits that
can be achieved through strong brand recognition.
- Size concentration index = SCI. The total number of automobiles produced
has been classified into four product groups: light, small, medium, and large.
These groups were used to calculate a Herfindahl concentration index.4 We
anticipate a positive relationship with POA as potential partner firms are
expected to enter into POA in order to gain access to technologies associated
with a particular class of cars.
IV. Determinants of POA
We estimated the following regression equation using 2SGLS.5
where xj stands for an explanatory variable, aj is the parameters to be
estimated and e i is the residual term. The sample is separated into POA’s
with foreign firms and POA’s with domestic firms, in order to estimate the
effects of the explanatory variables in each case. The regression results are
given in Table 1.
4 In this case, the Herfindahl index is a convex function of the production shares of each
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is the number of
automobiles produced in a particular product group, S  is the total number of automobiles
produced, and i =  (light, small, medium,
 
and large ). Concentration in a particular class
produces higher values for SCI. ( Shy (1995) ).
5 Equation (7) was initially estimated using OLS. However, the application of White’s
General Heteroscedasticity Test and the Durbin-Watson d Test detected heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation in the data. As a remedial measure the model was re-estimated using
2SGLS (Two Stage Generalized Least Squares).
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Table 1. Empirical Results for Domestic and Foreign POAs
                                         Domestic                                       Foreign
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
PCM 0.1911 0.1740 2.3061 ** 1.2515
ER -0.5003 * 0.0681 -0.5093 0.4015
R&D 0.9434 * 0.3654 -1.0738 1.2658
BRANDS -2.107 * 0.8155 -22.4142 * 6.5983
SCI 46.7051 * 2.8775 62.9763 * 10.7838
Notes: * and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
6 The positive coefficient for PCM seems to result from the drastic cost cutting measures
undertaking by foreign executives sent from parent firms. While Japanese automakers own
efficient technologies, their management style, sometimes called “Japanese style”
management, was not working well in the 1990’s. In particular, both the lifetime employment
and seniority wage systems reduced the flexibility of firms faced with increased global
competition. As soon as foreign executives were sent, they exercised large layoffs and
wage cuts.
First, looking at Table 1, PCM, BRANDS, and SCI are important factors
for foreign firms while for domestic firms ER, R&D, BRANDS, and SCI are
significant. The coefficient of PCM for foreign firms is positive suggesting
foreign firms are interested in short-term profitability.6 In the domestic case,
the coefficient for ER is negative. This result is unexpected. However, Japanese
automobile manufacturers in general have high ERs which in part stems from
a long history of reinvesting profits rather than paying out dividends to
shareholders. The negative impact of ER on POA may be due to an anticipated
reduction in the profits available for a firm’s own capital formation when it is
examining potential POAs.
Another point on which foreign firms and domestic firms differ is the
evaluation of R&D expenditures. The coefficient of R&D is significant in the
domestic case but not in the foreign case. There are two possible explanations
for this result. First, as many Japanese automobile manufactures are part of
consortiums which include parts suppliers, a large part of their R&D362 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
investments is directed towards improving the efficiency of this vertical supply
chain.7 Foreign firms may not be as interested in this kind of vertical investment
when looking for potential POAs. Second, the findings of Branstetter et al.
(1998) and Branstetter (2001) suggest that there are significant intranational
R&D  spillovers in Japan. For domestic firms, entering into a consortium is
one means of internalizing this “externality”. This infers that domestic firms
will be interested in entering into POAs with firms that are strong in R&D.
Foreign firms, on the other hand, may simply view entrance into the Japanese
market as a means of obtaining access to R&D and therefore not be particularly
concerned with the R&D expenditures of potential partner firms.
Finally, product match seems to be important for both domestic and foreign
firms. The coefficient for BRANDS is negative for both domestic and foreign
firms. This may indicate that automobile manufacturers look for weaker brands
when exploring POA opportunities. The coefficient of SCI  is positive and
significant for domestic and foreign firms. This suggests that firms are
interested in partner firms that specialize in a specific class of automobiles.
Their purpose may be the access of technologies related to a class of
automobiles. For example, it has been suggested that one reason for the
increase in the number of POAs between Japanese and foreign automobile
manufacturers is the interest of foreign firms in accessing the technology of
Japanese firms associated with smaller classes of cars.
Next, we examine whether or not the number of shares that a partner firm
holds is significant. We examine the case where the number of shares held by
a partner firm is greater than one-third (this is represented by a dummy variable
PRIMARY).8 Such a majority holding gives the partner firm the ability to
control activities and, therefore, influence profits, for example, by management
related decisions. The results for this regression are given in Table 2.
In general these results parallel those given in Table 1. PCM, ER and SCI
are all significant and found to have the same signs as those of the first
estimation. However, BRANDS and R&D are not significant. In this case, we
are particularly interested in PRIMARY, for which the estimated coefficient is
7 For a more detailed discussion on this topic see Qui and Spencer (2002).
8 PRIMARY = 1 when the number of shares held by a partner-firms is greater than one
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both positive and significant. This suggests that POA is positively related to
the level of ownership of partner firms.
In the next section we consider the effects of POA’s on PCM’s.
V. Determinants of PCM
In this section, we consider second stage optimization, where for given
sij’s (determined in the first stage) each firm chooses profit maximizing
production quantities. Assuming a closed economy (no exports or imports),
the conjectural variations model estimated by Alley (1997) is
PCMi = a1  POA + a2 MSi POA,                                                                                        (8)
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h =-  Equation (8) is not complete, but as a first approximation,
we employ equation (9).








Note: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
9 For a model with imports included, see footnote (14) of Alley (1997).364 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
12 3 ii PCM a POA a MS POA a DGR =+ +                                                        (9)
where DGR stands for the real rate of economic growth in GDP. Since equation
(9) is considered as an approximation, we are not interested in estimating a
or h. Rather, we are interested in examining the qualitative effects of
shareholder activities already determined in first-stage optimization.
Furthermore, to examine the effects of foreign ownership on PCM we include
a dummy variable, FOREIGN, in the regression.10 The results are summarized
in Table 3.
10 FOREIGN = 1 when the partner firm is foreign.
11 An anonymous referee suggested that the results reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3 may be
influenced by the success of Nissan during the period under examination. To check the
Table 3. Parameter Estimates
Coefficient Standard error
POA 1.9952 * 0.4900
MSPOA -0.3312 * 0.0973
DGR 0.5143 1.2109
FOREIGN 13.0029 ** 7.0899
Notes: * and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively
The estimated coefficients for POA and MSiPOA in Table 3 are significant.
While the coefficient of POA is positive, the coefficient of MSi POA is negative.
This suggests that entering into a POA increases price-cost margins (2%
higher). However, this effect decreases as the market share of the firm increases
inferring that POA are more advantageous for smaller firms. Consistent with
the findings of Yamawaki (1989) and Alley (1997) DGR is not significant
suggesting that domestic growth does not have an impact on PCM. Lastly,
the coefficient for FOREIGN is positive and significant. This suggests that
entering into a POA with a foreign firm increases the profitability of Japanese
automobile manufactures on average.11365 PARTIAL OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we presented a model that determines POAs endogenously.
We then examined the determinants of POAs in the Japanese automobile
industry empirically, with the intent of pointing out some of the behavior
differences between foreign and domestic firms. We found that technology
transfers and/or technology accumulation through POAs both directly and/or
indirectly induce behavioral differences. While both foreign and domestic
firms appear to be interested in the profitability of a POA, the former appear
to be more interested in short-term profitability and the latter in long-term
profitability. Both foreign and domestic firms are interested in specific
technologies, as reflected in the negative effect of BRANDS. Further, foreign
and domestic firms appear to examine product mix closely when exploring
potential POAs. In the domestic case this may indicate an interest in partner
firms that produce products of a similar nature, thus allowing for cost reduction
through parts standardization. On the other hand, in the foreign case, interest
seems to be directed toward gaining access to the extant technologies
associated with a particular vehicle class rather than potential technologies
that may be developed through R&D activities. Finally, majority share holdings
of one third or more were found to have a positive and significant effect on
POA’s.
Data Appendix
The data for 11 Japanese automobile manufacturers from 1990 to 2000
were collected from a number of sources. The number of automobiles in each
size class manufactured by each company were taken from the Automotive
Years HandBook. Data for POA, PCM, ER, R&D, and BRANDS are published
in the General Report on Securities and Japan’s domestic growth rate is
available from International Financial Statistics.
robustness of our results, all regression models were estimated without the data for Nissan.
While there were minimal changes in the size of estimated coefficients, no sign changes
occurred suggesting that the presented results are consistent.366 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table A.1. shows the Japanese firms included in the data set along with
their partner firms. The ownership shares are presented for the year 2000,
however, there is some variation in these over the data set. For the most part
ownership shares are increasing and the partner firm does not change during
the period under examination. Subaru is an exception where the partner firm
was Nissan from 1990 to 1999 but became GM in 2000.12
Table A1. Firms Included in the Data Set











Nissan Diesel Nissan and  RenaultD F 45.00
Note: Ownership share is the percentage of the Japanese firm’s stock held by the partner
firm in the year 2000. D and F, respectively, indicate domestic and foreign partners.
12 As a referee pointed out, Hino and Nissan Diesel respectively specialize in the production
of buses and trucks. From the point of view of technology transfers, it may be better to
separate passenger cars and trucks. In reality, however, many Japanese automakers, such
as Toyota, Isuzu and Suzuki, produce both passenger cars and trucks. Furthermore, some
of the major automobile manufacturers, such as Toyota and Nissan, form groups and
exchange engineers each other. In addition, an executive of one firm may sit on the board
of directors of another firm within the same group. See Alley(1997) for more detail on the
structure of cross-holdings of stock in the Japanese automobile industry.367 PARTIAL OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
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